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November 22, 1988 
Geoffrey Butlerf Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
Room 332 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84114 
RE: Utah^v^Viiil, No. 20111 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the appellant, Daniel Vijil, wishes to advise the Court of sup-
plemental authority, pertinent to this action, not previously 
cited by either party. 
In Billie v. Abbott (November 10, 19 88, A-CV-34-87) 
N.R. , the Navajo Supreme Court decided that, under prin-
ciples of Indian law previously discussed in the present case, 
Navajo Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate AFDC ar-
rearage collection actions involving Navajo parties who are 
Reservation residents. 
This decision is generally pertinent to all of the arguments 
made in the Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief. 
Your 
Steven 
Attorney at Law 
SB/cr 
cc: Mark Wainwright, Esq. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Blaine Ferguson, Esq. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake CItyf Utah 84114 
Craig Hallsf Esq. 
San Juan County Attorney 
Post Office Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Michael Upshaw, Esq. 
Navajo Attorney General 
Post Office Box 2010 
Window Rockf Arizona 86515 
A-CV-34-87 
SUPREME COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION 
mm 
N0V1S1983 
D.N A , INC. 
Mexican Hat 
Harold Billie, et al., Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
John Abbott, as Director of Utah 
Office of Recovery Services, Defendant-Appellant, 
OPINION 
Before TSO, Chief Justice, BLUEHOUSE and AUSTIN, Associate 
Justices. 
Appealed from the Window Rock District Court, the Honorable 
Robert Yazzie presiding. 
R. Dennis Ickes, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for the 
Appellant; Steven Boos, Esq., DNA-People's Legal Services, 
Mexican Hat, Utah, for the Appellee. 
Opinion delivered by AUSTIN, Associate Justice. 
This suit arose when John Abbott, a Utah official, 
intercepted the federal tax returns of Navajos living on the 
Navajo Reservation and whose children had received Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. The Navajo 
plaintiffs claim that their rights protected by federal laws 
were violated when Abbott caused the interceptions and when 
Abbott used Utah law to decide their child support 
1. Pub.L. No. 271, Sees. 401 et seg., 49 Stat. 627 et 
seg., Codified as Title IV-A of the Social Security Act; 42 
U.S.C. Sees. 601 et seg. 
obligations. A default judgment was entered against Abbott 
for his failure to comply with an order compelling discovery. 
On appeal from that judgment Abbott raised these issues: (1) 
Whether the Navajo district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in this case; (2) Whether the Navajo district 
court has personal jurisdiction over Abbott; (3) Whether the 
United States is an indispensable party to this case; (4) 
Whether this suit is properly maintained as a class action; 
(5) Whether the default judgment was properly entered; (6) 
Whether the default judgment amount is based upon reliable 
evidence; and (7) Whether plaintiff(s) is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. 
I. 
Harold Billie, his ex-wife Patsy (not a party), and 
all class members, (plaintiffs), are enrolled Navajos living 
on the Utah side of the Navajo Reservation. Plaintiffs have 
had their federal income tax returns intercepted by Abbott as 
a means of repaying Utah for child support payments made to 
plaintiffs7 children under the AFDC program. 
Navajo code law and Navajo common law regulate the 
domestic relations (i.e., divorce and child support) of 
Navajos living in Navajo Indian Country. Using these laws, 
2. The Navajo Indian Reservation is located within the 
States of Arizona, Utah and New Mexico. 
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Billie and Patsy were divorced in Navajo court on April 11, 
1983. The court gave Patsy custody of the children, and 
because Billie was unemployed, the court ordered Billie to 
"pay reasonable child support when he is employed and the 
monthly amount to be arranged by the parties." Billie v. 
Billie, No. SR-CV-112-83 (Divorce Decree). Billie and Patsy 
never returned to court to set the amount of Billie's child 
support payments. Instead, Patsy, without Billie's 
knowledge, applied directly to Utah for AFDC benefits. 
The AFDC program is a federal matching program 
designed to financially assist needy children; usually 
children who are not supported by their fathers. A state 
participant must submit a plan for approval by the federal 
government. Upon approval of its plan, a state can be 
reimbursed for any benefits it has paid to eligible 
applicants. Utah's plan was approved by the federal 
government. 
Utah processed Patsy's application for AFDC benefits 
using its plan and laws established specifically for deciding 
the amount of support to be paid in the absence of a court 
order. Federal law allows a state to use its administrative 
procedures to set the amount of AFDC benefits to be paid to 
support a child where there is no court order. 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 656 (a)(2)(b). These federal laws governing AFDC 
benefits do not mention Indians or Indian reservations. 
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There are no federal guidelines available that would guide 
the states in administering the AFDC program when Indians 
living on reservations apply for AFDC benefits. Patsy's 
application was approved and the Billie children received 
benefits. 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 656 states that any money a state pays 
to support a child under the AFDC program shall constitute an 
obligation owed to that state by the individual responsible 
for providing such support. Section 656 also allows a state 
to collect "under all applicable State and local processes." 
To collect the money Billie owed Utah, Abbott applied to the 
United States Secretary of the Treasury, using 42 U.S.C. Sec. 
664, to intercept Billie's federal income tax refunds. 
Section 664 directs the state to notify the Secretary if an 
individual owes the state past-due support. If there is 
money payable from the Treasury to that individual, the 
Secretary can withhold an amount equal to that past-due 
support and pay that amount to the state. The Secretary sent 
Utah the amounts Billie owed the state from Billie's 1984 and 
1985 federal income tax refunds. 
On April 28, 1987, Billie sued claiming that 
because Utah is barred from extending its laws into the 
Navajo Nation, Utah's use of its administrative procedures to 
determine plaintiffs' child support obligations was an 
invasion of rights secured to Navajo tribal members under the 
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Navajo Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 667, and other federal laws. 
Billie alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 
and a class suit under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Billie wants to stop Utah's tax 
interceptions because he claims that Utah's administrative 
procedures cannot lawfully be applied to Navajos living on 
the reservation. Billie wants all intercepted federal tax 
refunds returned and his costs and attorney's fees paid by 
Utah. 
On May 13, 1987, a request for production of 
documents necessary to determine the class was served on 
Abbott. Abbott then moved to dismiss the suit which was 
denied. After arguing the motion to dismiss, Abbott's 
counsel told the court that the discovery request will be 
answered. On August 21, 1987, the court granted Billie a 
preliminary injunction. 
On September 8, 1987, Billie moved to compel 
discovery because Abbott had not answered the request for 
production. On September 23, 1987, Abbott was ordered to 
answer discovery within 10 days or face a default judgment. 
Abbott received this order on October 1, 1987, but before 
receiving the order, Abbott appealed the orders granting the 
preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss. 
The next day Abbott moved for protection from discovery until 
this Court had decided the appeals filed on October 1, 1987. 
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The district court did not act upon this motion. This Court 
dismissed the two appeals on October 28, 1987. 
On November 4, 1987, the court granted Billie a 
default judgment because of Abbott's noncompliance with the 
order compelling discovery. Billie was awarded $218,278.66 
to cover intercepted federal tax refunds and $18,750.00 for 
attorney's fees. Abbott was permanently enjoined from 
intercepting the federal tax returns of class members. 
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A. 
Abbott concedes that the Navajo Nation has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the domestic relations of Navajos living on 
the reservation. Abbott, however, claims that if Navajos 
apply for AFDC benefits, then the AFDC legislation gives Utah 
pre-emptive and exclusive jurisdiction to decide their 
support obligations despite both parents and the children 
living on the reservation. Abbott's claim would divest the 
Navajo Nation of its exclusive jurisdiction over child 
support decisions involving Navajos living on the reservation 
when they apply for AFDC benefits. Abbott argues that, 
because the AFDC legislation has divested the Navajo Nation 
of jurisdiction, the Navajo district court does not have 
jurisdiction over claims against him. 
The issue, in cases where Navajos apply for AFDC 
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benefits, is whether the AFDC legislation has divested the 
Navajo Nation of its exclusive power to decide child support 
obligations of its members who live on the Navajo 
Reservation, and has that legislation vested exclusive 
jurisdiction in Utah to make those decisions. We find no 
such abrogation in the AFDC legislation; thus we hold that 
the district court has jurisdiction over Billie's claims 
against Abbott under this issue. 
Implicit in the Treaty of 1868 is the understanding 
that the internal affairs of the Navajo people are within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation government. 
Williams v. Lee. 358 U.S. 217, 221-222 (1959). And, "since 
the signing of the Navajo treaty, Congress has consistently 
acted upon the assumption that the States lacked jurisdiction 
over Navajos living on the reservation." McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 175 (1973). The 
sovereignty retained by an Indian tribe includes "the power 
of regulating [its] internal and social relations." United 
States v. Kagama. 118 U.S. 375, 381-382 (1886). Because 
Navajo domestic relations is the core of the tribe's 
"internal and social relations," the Navajo Nation has 
exclusive power over domestic relations among Navajos living 
on the reservation. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 
U.S. 382 (1976). 
Congress - can impose through legislation certain 
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limitations on Navajo sovereignty because Congress has 
special authority over Indian affairs. Johnson v. Navaio 
Nation, 5 Nav. R. (1987), A-CV-15-85. If a federal 
statute is to limit Indian sovereignty or override Indian 
rights, Congress must clearly show its intent to do so before 
a court will allow such intrusion. Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez. 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978). Tribes and the federal 
government have a special relationship from which the states 
are excluded unless Congress clearly allows the states to 
treat Indians as a part of the general community. Bryan v. 
Itasca County. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). Such congressional 
intent must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear 
from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. 
Id. at 393. The presumption is that a federal statute is not 
intended to make a radical change in Indian affairs, thus 
federal statutes should be construed in favor of retained 
tribal self-government. See Bryan. Id.; Martinez. Id. The 
federal policy embodied in numerous federal statutes and 
federal court decisions is that the Indian tribes must 
exercise the full extent of their sovereignty. See Martinez. 
Id. 
Congress has not clearly expressed its intent that 42 
U.S.C. Sec. 656 (determination of child support absent a 
court order), nor any section of the AFDC legislation, is 
meant to abrogate Indian tribal sovereignty. A congressional 
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intent to allow states to decide the child support 
obligations of Indians living on a reservation is not clearly 
expressed on the face of the AFDC legislation. As a general 
statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq., cannot be read as 
expressly abrogating the exclusive powers of the Navajo 
Nation to decide its members' domestic relations; thus the 
AFDC legislation does not expressly sanction Utah's 
interference in Navajo domestic relations. In fact, neither 
Indians nor Indian tribes are mentioned in the AFDC 
legislation. 
Some general federal statutes which do not mention 
Indians or Indian tribes have been applied to Indian tribes. 
See, e.g., Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800 (1976). Even a statute of this nature, however, 
is required to show a congressional intent to intrude on 
Indian rights through its surrounding circumstances and 
legislative history. Colorado River, Id. at 811-813; Bryan 
v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. at 393. Aside from the broad 
statement that "The AFDC legislation is a statute of general 
application and as such it was intended to apply to all 
residents of the United States, including Indian residents," 
Abbott has not shown any legislative history nor any 
surrounding circumstances of the AFDC legislation which would 
clearly show that Congress intended to intrude on tribal 
domestic relations. Because the AFDC legislation does not 
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show an intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty, either clearly 
on its face or through its surrounding circumstances and 
legislative history, the Navajo Nation has retained its 
exclusive jurisdiction over tribal members' child support 
obligations. 
Cases may arise where tribal self-government may 
conflict with a federal law of general application. Even in 
these situations, "the Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized the unique status of tribes, Indians, and their 
lands, and has required that the congressional purpose of a 
conflicting law clearly require that it apply to Indians 
before Indian rights are held implicitly infringed." F. 
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 286 (1982 ed.). The 
AFDC legislation clearly does not intend a state to be the 
only sovereign to decide the child support obligations of 
Indians living on a reservation. Abbotts reliance on 
Colorado River to advance this argument is unpersuasive. 
In Colorado River the Court held that states have 
jurisdiction over Indian water rights' issues under the 
McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 666. Like the AFDC 
legislation, the McCarran Amendment did not mention Indians, 
yet, unlike the AFDC legislation, the legislative history of 
the McCarran Amendment was replete with references to its 
effect on Indians. Regardless of this difference Colorado 
River is best confined to the uniqueness of water 
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adjudication, see Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 
U.S. 545 (1983), rather than being applied to a question of a 
state's attempt to assert jurisdiction over an Indian tribe's 
internal affairs. 
The Navajo Nation's exclusive power to regulate 
domestic relations among Navajos living within its borders is 
beyond doubt. The Navajo Nation has codified law and case 
law regulating Navajo domestic relations. And the Navajo 
Nation's right to make its own laws and be ruled by them is 
an established principle in Indian law. Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313 
(1978). Accordingly, absent explicit congressional 
authorization, if a state infringes on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be governed by 
them, that state has acted outside its authority. See 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220-223; McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n. 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973). The AFDC 
legislation does not explicitly authorize Utah to decide 
tribal domestic relations, thus, Utah's determination of 
Billie's support obligation is an unlawful interference with 
Billie's right to be regulated by Navajo law. Billie can 
seek the protection of Navajo law to preserve his right to 
have his support obligation decided by Navajo law. 
B. 
Abbott argues that Utah's implementation of the AFDC 
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legislation would be frustrated if he cannot use Utah law to 
decide the amount of child support obligations of Navajos, 
especially if there is no Navajo court order. Abbott 
predicts more obstacles if he is required to pursue 
collection through the Navajo courts. In narrow cases a 
state may extend its laws onto a reservation to protect its 
legitimate interest. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 
411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973). But even there the state must show 
that essential tribal relations are not involved and that 
rights of tribal members will not be jeopardized. Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). Although Utah has an 
interest in serving eligible Navajo children, the manner in 
which it determines eligibility (use of non-Navajo law) 
implicates essential Navajo tribal relations, and in the end 
Utah jeopardizes the rights of Navajos to have their support 
decided by Navajo courts. 
Only Navajo courts using Navajo law can decide 
Billie's child support obligation. Only Navajo courts can be 
used to collect past-due support owed by Navajos living on 
the Navajo Reservation. Navajo self-government mandates it. 
If Utah laws are used to decide the child support obligations 
of Navajos, then, Utah laws would supplant Navajo laws and 
firmly established Navajo cultural practices on domestic 
relations. 
Navajo statutes and case law reflect Navajo culture 
-12-
and the unique circumstances and needs of the Navajo people 
living on the reservation. State determinations of tribal 
domestic relations, no matter how narrow the intrusion, is 
always hostile to and in conflict with the needs of the 
Indian people• For this very reason we disagree with the 
decision in New Mexico v. Joiola, 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590 
(1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 803 (1983); a case cited by 
Abbott. There the Court clearly ignored an Indian tribe's 
right to regulate its internal relations. 
A further danger is that state decisions on Navajo 
domestic relations may cause a decline in Navajo court 
authority over Navajos and over Navajo domestic relations. 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 388 (1976). Utah's decision on Billie's 
support obligation would not only adversely affect Navajo 
authority over internal tribal matters, but it may encourage 
Navajos to go directly to Utah in hopes of receiving a larger 
award. State interference would indeed hinder the 
development of Navajo domestic relations law. There is 
clearly infringement upon Navajo self-government when a state 
official decides the child support payments of Navajos living 
on the reservation. 
Federal statutes passed to benefit Indians are 
construed to favor the Indians. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. 
United States. 248 U.S. 78 (1918). The policy for this 
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construction is "rooted in the special trust relationship 
between the United States and Indian tribes." F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 224 (1982 ed.). See also 
Tulee v. Washington. 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Carpenter v. Shaw, 
280 U.S. 363 (1930). There is no reason why this same policy 
should not support construing a general federal statute 
consistent with Congress7 goal of tribal self-government. 
Utah and the Navajo Nation, no doubt, can cooperate so that 
the AFDC legislation is implemented in a way that benefits 
Navajos living on the reservation without violating the 
federal purpose. The AFDC legislation is flexible enough so 
that Abbott can come to Navajo courts to adjudicate the 
support amount, or Utah can require Navajo applicants to go 
first to Navajo courts for support decisions. In this case 
the Navajo court had continuing jurisdiction over Billie's 
support obligation, and Utah, which had no jurisdiction, 
should have required Patsy to return to the Navajo court. 
Once a Navajo court has decided the amount of child 
support that should be paid, and after AFDC benefits are 
paid, Utah again must pursue its arrearage collection through 
the Navajo courts. This again is not contrary to the AFDC 
legislation which authorizes a state to use courts for 
collection. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 656 (a)(1). Certainly, 
cooperation between the Navajo Nation and Utah would have far 
better results than costly litigation. 
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c. 
Abbott also claims that under Utah's sovereign 
immunity statute, UTAH CODE ANN. Sec. 63-30-3 (Supp. 1979), 
Billie is barred from suing a Utah official in Navajo court. 
This would be true if Billie was strictly a resident of Utah 
suing in Utah state court and not a resident of the Navajo 
Reservation. A suit against a state in its own court is 
governed by the state's own laws. The question remains 
whether the Navajo court should recognize Utah's defense of 
sovereign immunity. 
Although Abbott has not argued that any federal law 
may have limited the power of the Navajo Nation over a state 
official, we feel obligated to make that inquiry. Our review 
of the Treaty of 1868 has not disclosed any such limitation 
on Navajo sovereignty. And we have not found any federal 
statute with such limitation. The fact is suits against 
state political sub-divisions in tribal courts are not 
unknown. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow 
Tribe. 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985); Hubbard v. Chinle School Dist. 
Nos. 24/25. 3 Nav. R. 167 (1982). 
The issue concerning a suit against a state in 
another state's court was decided in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 
410 (1979). In Hall the Court found that when a state is 
sued in another sovereign's court, the rule governing state 
suability in its own court is not controlling because "[s]uch 
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a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a 
second sovereign." Id. at 416. The Court said that if a 
state's sovereign immunity is to be recognized by the second 
sovereign, then "its source must be found in an agreementf 
express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the 
voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of 
the first as a matter of comity." Id. at 416 
The Navajo Nation does not grant immunity from suit 
to any state as a matter of comity. We have also not found 
any agreement, express or implied, between the Navajo Nation 
and Utah which would require this Court to recognize Utah's 
defense of sovereign immunity. We have previously said that 
the states of the Union are foreign governments in relation 
to the Navajo Nation. Hubbard, 3 Nav. R. at 169. In Hubbard 
we further ruled that the Navajo Nation courts have 
jurisdiction over suits against a state. Id. at 170. The 
reverse, however, a suit against the Navajo Nation in Utah 
court, would be barred by tribal immunity from suit, not as 
a matter of comity, but based upon federal pre-emption. 
III. Personal Jurisdiction 
A. 
The question here is whether Abbott has caused an 
action to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Navajo Nation so that he is subject to Navajo court 
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jurisdiction. We hold that he has. 
At the outset we establish that a defendant may cause 
personal injury actionable in Navajo court without ever 
having set foot on Navajo soil. In a prior decision this 
Court said that the Navajo courts have jurisdiction "over any 
person doing injury within the Navajo Nation...." Deal v. 
Blatchford. 3 Nav. R. 159, 160 (1982); Accord. Keith v. 
Allred. 3 Nav. R. 191 (Chinle Dist. Ct. 1981). We further 
find that claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 are best 
characterized as personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 
471 U.S. 261 (1985). 
Tribal members residing on a reservation have certain 
rights protected by federal law while they exercise those 
rights within the boundaries of the reservation. For 
example, a state may not tax a Navajo's income derived from 
Navajo Reservation sources, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Common, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); a civil suit against a Navajo 
residing on the Navajo Reservation must be brought in Navajo 
court, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); and Navajos 
residing on the reservation have the right to have a Navajo 
court decide their domestic relations, Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). These rights guaranteed to 
tribal members have no effect off the reservation, because 
"[ajbsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going 
beyond reservation boundaries have generally been subject to 
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nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all 
citizens of the state." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145, 148-149 (1973). 
Whenever any right that an enrolled Navajo has while 
residing on the Navajo Reservation is abrogated by a state 
official, that Navajo has suffered a personal injury. See 
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). When those rights 
that exist only within the boundaries of the reservation are 
violated, the injury occurs on the reservation, because those 
rights generally are not effective off the reservation. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148-149. 
Domestic disputes arising among Navajos residing on 
the reservation are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Navajo courts. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 
(1976); Arviso v. Dahozy, 3 Nav. R. 84 (1982). If a state 
official interferes in the domestic disputes of Navajos 
living on the reservation then the official has caused an 
action to occur within the Navajo Nation. This is true 
although the state official may not have entered the 
reservation. A Navajo's right to have his domestic dispute 
heard by a Navajo court is effective while he resides on the 
reservation. Because of the Navajo Nation's exclusive 
jurisdiction over Navajo domestic relations, Billie has a 
right to have his child support decided only by a Navajo 
court. When Abbott used Utah administrative procedures to 
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decide Billie's support obligation, he denied Billie a right 
to present evidence on culture and traditions, and other 
factors unique to Navajo people. This denial has caused 
Billie a personal injury actionable in a Navajo court and 
that injury took place on the reservation. 
We next consider Abbott's argument that unless he has 
minimum contacts with the Navajo Nation, due process dictates 
that the Navajo Nation has no personal jurisdiction over him. 
The United States Supreme Court cases stating that a 
defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state to 
be brought into the state's court are based on the fourteenth 
amendment due process clause of the United States 
Constitution. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 291 (1980). Because the United States Supreme Court has 
held that the Indian tribes are not constrained by the Bill 
of Rights in the United States Constitution, Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 
163 U.S. 376 (1895), we are not bound by the rationale nor 
the holding of any case construing those amendments. 
Despite the inapplicability of the United States 
Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1302(8), and the Navajo Bill of Rights (NBR), 1 N.T.C. 
Sec. 3, both require that Abbott must be given due process. 
Furthermore, in at least one case a Navajo court mentioned 
minimum contacts. See Peterson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2 
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Nav. R. 36 (Crownpoint Dist. Ct. 1979). Due process under 
the ICRA and the NBR must be interpreted in a way that will 
enhance Navajo culture and tradition. Navajo domestic 
relations, such as divorce or child support, is an area where 
Navajo traditions are the strongest. To enhance the Navajo 
culture the Navajo courts must synthesize the principles of 
Navajo government and custom law. From this synthesis Navajo 
due process is formed. 
When Navajo sovereignty and cultural autonomy are at 
stake, the Navajo courts must have broad based discretion in 
interpreting the due process clauses of the ICRA and NBR, and 
the courts may apply Navajo due process in a way that 
protects civil liberties while preserving Navajo culture and 
self-government. Abbott has interfered with the domestic 
relations of Navajos, a subject with strong cultural ties. 
This has caused personal injury unique to Navajos residing on 
the reservation. We have just held that this personal injury 
occurred on the Navajo Reservation, thus, Abbott has made 
"minimum contact" with the Navajo Nation to satisfy the 
requirement of Navajo due process under the ICRA and under 
the NBR. 
B. 
Abbott also asserts that service of process on him 
outside the reservation was insufficient because he did not 
engage in activities on the Navajo Reservation which would 
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subject him to personal jurisdiction in Navajo court. 
Service was made on Abbott by certified mail. Such 
service was proper. Rule 3, NRCP (1978 ed.); Peterson v. 
Ford Motor Credit Co., 2 Nav. R. 36, 41 (Crownpoint Dist. Ct. 
1979). A state official is amenable to the service of 
process of the Navajo courts if that official has caused an 
action to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Navajo Nation. Abbott has caused Billie an injury on the 
Navajo Reservation. The service notified Abbott of the suit 
against him, so it complied with all due process 
requirements. 
IV. The United States as an Indispensable Party 
Abbott argues that the United States is an 
indispensable party to this action because federal 
legislation is at issue, and if the Navajo court rules for 
Billie, the rights of the United States will be impaired. 
Simply because federal legislation is at issue does not make 
the United States an indispensable party. "[I]mportant 
questions about legislation are [often] presented to courts 
without the sovereign being joined as an indispensable 
party." Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Nav. R. 189, 203 (1978). 
A party is indispensable to a lawsuit if that party 
has an interest in the action, and the disposition of the 
action in his absence may impair his ability to protect that 
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interest, FRCP 19(a). An indispensable party is one whose 
relationship to the controversy is such that any decree 
entered would affect that party's rights. Pulitzer-Polster 
v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986). 
We hold that the United States is not an 
indispensable party to this lawsuit. No interest of the 
United States is impaired or affected by requiring Abbott to 
litigate Navajo child support obligations in Navajo court. 
Neither does such a requirement burden Utah, making 
implementation of the AFDC legislation more difficult. The 
AFDC legislation is not being undermined. Instead, the AFDC 
legislation is being clarified as it is applied to tribal 
residents of a reservation. 
V. The Propriety of this Suit as a Class Action 
Abbott claims that because the Navajo Tribal Code 
and the Navajo Court Rules say nothing about class actions, 
such an action cannot be brought in a Navajo court. In the 
alternative, Abbott argues that even if Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in Navajo 
court, Billie's complaint failed to meet the requirements of 
a class action. 
Billie argues that 7 N.T.C. Sec. 204 allows the 
Navajo courts to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Billie also asserts that when the district court entered the 
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default judgment, the effect was the same as if Abbott had 
admitted all the allegations in the complaint. Therefore, 
unless the district court abused its discretion in entering 
the default judgment, the certification of the class must 
remain undisturbed. 
7 N.T.C. Sec. 204 does authorize the Navajo courts 
to use any applicable law of the United States in any 
controversy, so the district court's use of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was proper. Class actions 
are often a desirable method of dispute resolution, because 
they eliminate separate suits thereby providing for judicial 
efficiency. 
To maintain a class action under Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, four criteria must be met: 
the class must be so numerous that joinder is impracticable; 
there must be questions of law or fact common to the class; 
the claims or defenses of the representative party must be 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and the 
representative party must fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. Billie failed to make a positive 
showing that his lawsuit met the criteria for class action 
suits. This failure may have been partly a result of 
Abbott's failure to provide the necessary documents to Billie 
for assessment of the class. Therefore, the district court's 
decree that the action was properly maintained as a class 
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action is erroneous. 
Even though all allegations in a complaint are 
generally taken as true in a default judgment, Postal Ben. 
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 165 P.2d 173, 178 (Ariz. 1946), Billie's 
bald assertions regarding the class are not enough. Even in 
a default judgment the plaintiff needs facts to prove that 
his suit qualifies as a class action. We reverse the 
district court's ruling on the class action and we remand so 
that Billie may properly qualify his suit as a class action. 
VI. The Propriety of the Default Judgment Entry 
The district court determines primarily whether a 
party's failure to comply with a court's order was willful, 
and whether the circumstances were so aggravated as to 
justify a default judgment. See Chavez v. Tome, 5 Nav. R. 
(1987); A-CV-10-87 (slip op. at 10); Four Corners Auto 
Sales v. Begay, 4 Nav. R. 100, 103 (1983). The choice of the 
appropriate discretionary sanction for ignoring a court order 
compelling discovery is primarily the responsibility of the 
trial judge, and the judge's decision cannot be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion. Chavez v. Tome, Id. , (slip 
op. at 7-8). The district court stated in its conclusions of 
law that Abbott's disobedience to the discovery order was 
willful, in bad faith, and represented contempt of court. In 
evaluating the district court finding, the question is not 
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whether this Court would have entered a default judgment, but 
whether the district court abused its discretion in doing so. 
However, where a judgment involves a default, our review 
should be particularly scrupulous lest the district court 
resort too quickly to this extreme sanction which amounts to 
a judgment against the defendant without an opportunity to be 
heard on the merits. 
A trial on the merits is strongly favored over a 
default judgment, see, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson. 3 Nav. R. 145, 
147 (1982). However, a default judgment protects a diligent 
party from continual delay and uncertainty as to his rights. 
Therefore, in deciding whether to grant a default judgment or 
not, a court must strike a balance between the need to 
prevent delay and the sound public policy of 
adjudicating cases on the merits. Chavez v. Tome. Id. (slip 
op. at 10-11). 
The most severe sanction for a failure to obey a 
court order is a default judgment, and a court should impose 
such a sanction only in the most extreme circumstances. The 
evidence does not support the harsh sanction of a default 
judgment here. Abbott's conduct was not egregious enough to 
warrant a default judgment against him; he did not flatly 
refuse to comply, or constantly fail to meet deadlines or 
obey orders. The facts show that Abbott had filed two 
appeals prior to receiving the order compelling discovery. 
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Immediately after receiving the order, Abbott moved for an 
order seeking protection from discovery pending this Court's 
decision on the two appeals. The district court did not act 
on Abbott's motion. Although the appeals were dismissed by 
this Court, Abbott's actions were done in good faith. We 
reverse the judgment of default entered by the district 
court. 
VII. The Amount of the Default Award 
Because we reverse the default judgment, the default 
award amount is also reversed, and we need not reach the 
issue of whether the amount was based upon reliable evidence. 
We also reverse and vacate the award of attorney's fees for 
the same reason. 
The Window Rock District Court is affirmed in part; 
reversed in part; and the case is remanded to that court. 
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